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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Enlightenment period was characterized by differing strains of 
intellectual thought, from which emerged the skeptical philosophy of 
David Hume (1711-1776). He held that many accepted philosophical 
and theological beliefs were devoid of epistemological proof and there-
fore could not be known with certainty to be true. His twofold attack 
against the inerrancy of Scripture consisted initially of denying the 
particular evidences in the form of miracles by holding to the superior-
ity of man's experience for the laws of nature. Also, he further posited 
empirical standards of judgment against the Christian belief in the 
inspiration of Scripture as a whole. By these specific means, in particu-
lar, Hume possibly exercised the greatest influence on the rejection of 
inerrancy by critical philosophers and theologians of various schools of 
thought from his time to the present. 
In spite of the immense influence of his critique, both Hume and 
those who have generally followed him in these endeavors are refuted 
on several accounts in their attempts to dismiss either miracles or the 
inerrancy of Scripture as a whole. In particular, they failed by not 
ascertaining if there is a God who chose to act in history by temporarily 
suspending the laws of nature and in written revelation in Scripture. 
Since both Hume and his followers have failed in their endeavor to 
dismiss the truthfulness of such beliefs, the possibility of a Christian 
theistic world view certainly remains. 
2 Gary R. Habermas 
SKEPTICISM: HUME 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT was a particularly significant 
period in the formulation of modern thought. The seventeenth 
century marked the development of three strains that later 
dominated Enlightenment philosophy. The chiefly Continental 
movement known as rationalism received its impetus from Rene 
Descartes (1596-1650). This philosophy was further developed 
by such scholars as Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) and Gottfried 
Leibniz (1646-1716). Deism emerged from the teachings of 
Herbert ofCherbury (1583-1648) and was popular in England 
chiefly among such scholars as M;=ttthew Tindal (c. 1655-1733) 
and John Toland (1670-1722). British empiricism grew out of 
the thought of Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Within the empirical 
tradition were John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (c. 
1685-1753), and David Hume (1711-1776). These three 
philosophical traditions are often grouped because their 
methodologies are closely related to one another. 
Enlightenment philosophers espoused concepts that have had 
great influence on twentieth-century epistemology. For this rea-
son, a brief overview of these three movements that arose during 
the Enlightenment will provide background for identifying and 
evaluating David Hume's influence on the denial of biblical au-
thority. 
25 
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BACKGROUND OF HUME'S THOUG.HT 
The rationalists' epistemology was based on the theory that 
reality is essentially rational and that by making the proper 
deductions, an individual could achieve knowledge of self, 
others, and the world. Reason and particularly deductive logic 
were emphasized. Even God could be known, at least to some 
extent, by the exercise of reason. 
Descartes started with the reality of doubt and the ability to 
think. His well-known dictum "I think, therefore I am" is a good 
example of rationalism's stress on reason. Beginning with the 
truth that we doubt and are therefore not perfect, he reasoned to 
the existence of God as the Perfect Being, using the ontological 
and cosmological proofs. Since a Perfect Being would not deceive 
lesser beings, whatever we can deduce by means of clear and 
distinct reasoning concerning the reality of the world must 
therefore be true. 1 
Spinoza also held that the universe is structured on rational 
principles and that it can be known through the proper exercise 
of reason. However, dismissing Descartes's mind-body dualism 
in favor of pantheism, he maintained that reality is composed of 
one substance. Because God, the world, and human beings are 
rational, worship is also to be expressed rationally. Ideas such as 
these are expressed in his major work, Ethics, published post-
humously. Especially noteworthy for our study ofHume is that 
Spinoza held that miracles, if understood as violations of nature, 
do not occur. 2 Some of the beginnings of biblical criticism can 
thus be seen in the work of this philosopher. 
Leibniz was another thinker in the tradition of rationalism. In 
his key work, Monadology, he described reality in terms of 
monads-metaphysical units of force. This theory contrasts with 
the view of materialism, in which the atom is the basic compo-
nent of reality. Leibniz spoke of a hierarchy of monads, cul-
minating in God, the Monad of monads. Accepting some of the 
arguments set forth by other rationalists to prove the existence of 
God, Leibniz maintained that God ordered the monads in such a 
way that the universe is completely rational and that this is "the 
best of all possible worlds." 
Contemporary with the rise of Continental rationalism was 
English deism. Herbert of Cherbury is considered the founder of 
this movement. In De Veritate Herbert delineated five "common 
bn 
SKEPTICISM. HUME 27 
notions" about religion: the existence of a supreme God, the 
worship of God, the need to live a moral life, repentance from 
sin, and an eternal life of either reward or punishment.3 He 
offered these as principles that are the foundation of world reli-
gions and that constitute the essence of true religion. These five 
principles, Herbert claimed, are based on mankind's common 
reason. 
The major endeavor of the deists was to formulate a natural 
religion based on reason as the primary authority. For some 
scholars, including Herbert of Cherbury, reason could support 
the orthodox understanding of the Christian faith. There were 
discrepancies between this approach and revealed Christianity, 
but this form of deism was not an outright attempt to disprove 
Christian belief. 
Other deists, however, presented their positions as alterna-
tives to revealed religion. Matthew Tindal, for example, consid-
ered "true" Christianity to be synonymous with natural religion. 
In his view, all doctrines not conforming to reason were to be 
rejected. Miracles were dismissed and morality was stressed. 
John Toland also believed that nothing in the Bible could 
conflict with reason. Therefore, miracles were given natural ex-
planations. To these deists, comparative religion and critical 
investigations of Christianity were popular studies. In fact, 
deism had a major influence on biblical criticism. The stress on 
reason led to close similarities to rationalism, but the deists were 
also affected by the British empiricists. 
Rebuttals to those deists who were critical of Christianity were 
offered by such philosophers as John Locke (see below), Thomas 
Sherlock (1678-1761),Joseph Butler (1692-1752), and William 
Paley (1743-1805). The work of Butler, in particular, is thought 
to have been a major factor in the fall of deism.4 These scholars 
argued for the rationality of revealed religion and also wrote in 
defense of miracles. Some of their works are appreciated even 
today as well-reasoned defenses of Christianity. 
About the same time that deism and rationalism were devel-
oping, British empiricism was emerging in England. The British 
empiricists were convinced that argumentation based on deduc-
tive reasoning (the scholastics) or on innate principles of the 
mind (the rationalists) is not valid. Rather, these scholars based 
their epistemology on verification of sense experience. Empirical 
investigation is thus the chief test of truth claims. 
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Francis Bacon was one scholar who rejected the methodology 
of scholastic theology. In Novum Organum he proposed that in-
ductive logic replace Aristotle's deductive logic. (Aristotle's de-
ductive approach had greatly influenced Western thought since 
the late Middle Ages.) Bacon helped to develop the experimental 
method, in which data are gathered and organized inductively so 
that conclusions can be drawn. His methodology was very 
influential for subsequent empirical systems. 
John Locke also challenged the thinking of the past. In Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding he rejected Descartes's theory 
that there are innate ideas in the human mind. Instead, Locke 
maintained that the mind is an "empty slate" at birth. Knowl-
edge is obtained by the accumulation of sensory data-this is the 
basis of all learning-and by reflection on that data. Thus Locke 
rejected the logic of the rationalists in favor of knowledge gained 
through the senses. Interestingly enough, Locke also defended 
the tenets of Christian theology. In The Reasonableness of Chris-
tianiry he argued that miracles validate Christian doctrine and 
point to God's activity in the world. 
George Berkeley took Locke's theory of knowledge one step 
further. In Principles of Human Knowledge and other works he 
taught that learning is a mental process. We do not actually 
know the material world. All that can be said to exist are other 
minds (spirits) and their mental perceptions (ideas). For some-
thing to exist, it must be perceived. However, reality does not 
cease to exist if it is not observed by a human being, for reality is 
still perceived by God, the Eternal Perceiver. Berkeley saw in 
this approach a new argument for the existence of God. 
In summary, three major Enlightenment schools of 
thought-rationalism, deism, and empiricism-provided the 
background for the philosophy of David Hume. While often 
categorized as an empiricist, Hume was critical of each of these 
movements. In much of his work he questioned the epis-
temological bases of philosophical beliefs, and in so doing he 
attempted to establish that some longstanding assumptions were 
devoid of epistemological proof. 
HUME'S EPISTEMOLOGY 
Though often placed in the tradition of British empiricism, 
Hume arrived at more radical conclusions. He continued the 
emphasis on sense experience by distinguishing between 
r 
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impressions-that is, sense perceptions-and ideas-memories 
or recollections of these impressions. The validity of an idea can 
be tested by tracing it back to the impression. If the idea consis-
tently conforms to the impression, then it is valid. If it does not 
conform, then it must be rejected. 
However, this explanation implies that Hume was much less 
skeptical in epistemological matters than he actually was. Hume 
went beyond Locke in asserting that the external world cannot 
be verified with absolute certainty. He went beyond Berkeley in 
concluding that spirit also cannot be verified and therefore is not 
empirically knowable. Here, where he differs with Locke and 
Berkeley, we can see Hume's major effect on empiricism. He 
postulated that commonly accepted beliefs such as the reality of 
the external world and even the existence of the self cannot be 
proven to be true. As will be shown below, Hume pointed out 
that certainty will more likely come from abstract reasoning 
(such as mathematics, logic, or tautologies), while knowledge is 
derived from empirical data. Even then, we must rely on proba-
ble knowledge and not proven certainties. 
One of Hume's best-known teachings was that cause and ef-
fect cannot be proven to be true, in spite of the long-held belief 
on the part of most men that certain effects follow naturally from 
certain causes. In Hume's thinking, we observe these successive 
events, but we cannot find the necessary link between them. 
Cause and effect can only be accepted by instinct or by faith. 
Hl.lme directed stern rebukes at rationalists and deists who 
believed that reason could penetrate metaphysical issues such as 
the existence of God and other theological truths. In Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion he voiced doubts concerning some as-
pects of the traditional theistic proofs. In The Natural History of 
Religion he asserted that the earliest religion of humankind was 
not a monotheism characterized by fundamental rational princi-
ples, but rather a polytheism that evolved into monotheism. This 
view challenged a cornerstone of deistic thought. In denying the 
supremacy of reason, Hume called into question the very basis of 
rationalism and deism. 
Hume also rejected much of the ethics developed by the 
rationalists when he denied that natural law provides any basis 
for morals. In yet another critique he maintained that immortal-
ity cannot be proven because there is no way to demonstrate the 
existence of an immaterial soul. 
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Hume agreed with Spinoza and some of the deists in rejecting 
miracles and special revelation. Few thinkers have created more 
doubt concerning the tenets of Christianity than Hume. 
In short, Hume believed that there are definite limits in epis-
temology, and these limits even affect areas that had come to be 
regarded as truth or knowledge. Throughout it is important to 
note his usage of probability. Although many have held that 
Hume denied such concepts as cause and effect, theistic argu-
ments, absolute ethics, and immortality, it is more likely that he 
proclaimed such could not be known to be true in the sense of 
proof Thus, while such teachings could be true (and they can be 
accepted by instinct, habit, or faith), the crux of the matter is 
that we cannot know them to be true. Although this appears to be 
less of a frontal assault, herein lies much of Hume's influence. 
BASIC PREMISES IN HUME'S VIEW OF SCRIPTURE 
Hume rejected the claim that Scripture is inspired and is 
thereby an authoritative revelation of God to humanity. There 
were at least two reasons for this denial of inspiration. One 
concerns the particulars in Scripture, and the other has to do with 
Scripture as a whole. Hume denied the particular evidences for 
Scripture when he asserted that, according to the canons of 
probability, miracles and prophecy cannot be used as super-
natural indications of the inspiration of Scripture. He rejected 
the inspiration of Scripture as a whole by judging that it was not a 
work of abstract reasoning, and that it could not be verified by 
empirical testing. Therefore, according to Hume, the Scriptures 
"contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." 5 Thus, since 
neither particular evidences nor the Scripture as a whole can be 
accepted as inspired, the Bible cannot be considered a reliable 
basis for knowledge. There is no way to know that Scripture 
contains God's words for humankind. 
We will examine these two premises in more detail. This is not to 
say that Hume's other views are not relevant here. However, in 
these two ideas Hume was taking direct aim at the veracity of 
Scripture. These two premises have been a major factor in the 
rejection of the inspiration of Scripture in the twentieth century. 
Concerning Miracles 
Hume's essay "Of Miracles" is part of An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding (1751), one of his major works. In this essay 
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he defines a miracle as «a transgression of a law of nature by a 
particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible 
agent" (Hume's emphasis). Hume asserts that the laws of nature 
are themselves proof against miracles: 
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and 
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof 
against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as 
any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.6 
Not only would the occurrence of miracles entail a breaking of 
nature's laws by the will of God (or some other invisible agent), 
but such occurrences are extremely improbable. The twofold 
evidence supplied by the laws of nature and man's experience of 
these laws provides a proof against a miracle. To state it another 
way, Hume believes that miracles have not occurred, for they are 
dis proven by the superior evidence of the uniformity of nature's 
laws, as witnessed by the experience of mankind. 7 
To support this major argument, Hume introduces four sub-
sidiary points. 8 First, he asserts that no miracle has ever been 
attested by a sufficient number of competent witnesses who are 
beyond reproach, suspicion, or delusion. 
Second, people like to speak of extraordinary and unique 
events and to spread tales about them. In fact, even if a story is 
false, people will continue to lie about it in order to promote their 
own vanity or some personal cause. 
Third, miracles usually occur among barbarous and ignorant 
peoples. And lying is a possible explanation in these cases also. 
Fourth, the miracles in the various world religions supposedly 
support the teachings of that religion. But since such miracles 
and teachings conflict with those of other religions, they oppose 
and cancel out each other, leaving no instances of valid super-
na tural even ts. 
Hume sought in this way to remove the evidential basis for all 
miracles and to show that reports of miracles are untrustworthy. 
He realized that by casting doubt on miracles and prophecy, a 
form of miracle, he was also destroying Christianity's claim that 
Scripture is an inspired revelation from God, since no evidence 
would then remain to support such beliefs. 
In the concluding paragraphs of his essay, Hume adds that 
Christianity is founded on faith and cannot be defended by rea-
son.9 
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Concerning Scripture as a Whole 
Hume ends the Enquiry with a brief and almost entirely un-
explained but very important statement: 
If we take in our hand any volume-of divinity or school 
metaphysics, for instance-let us ask, Does it contain any abstract 
reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experi-
mental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it 
then to the flames: for it can contain nothing except sophistry and 
illusion (Hume's emphasis).lo 
For Hume, then, theology is not a subject concerning which 
we can gain verifiable knowledge. Only assertions that involve 
abstract reasoning-such as mathematics, logic, and statements 
that are true by definition-or assertions that correspond to 
empirical data can be said to be knowable. If something is not 
true by definition or by evidence based on human experience, it 
cannot be known to be true. 
Therefore, the Scriptures cannot be used for drawing objective 
epistemological conclusions. Hume insisted that theological mat-
ters cannot be known to be true. The Scriptures can be believed 
by faith alone. This belief was very influential in later 
philosophical discussions. 
HUME'S INFLUENCE ON THE 
DENIAL OF BIBLICAL AUTHORITY 
The Rejection of Miracles 
Hume published the best known and most influential attack 
against miracles in the history of intellectual thought. According 
to John Herman Randall, Jr., this philosophical protest was so 
influential that it was the determining force in causing religious 
liberals from Hume's time to the present to reject miracles.ll 
Wilbur M. Smith contends that Hume's work was the strong-
est argument ever raised contrary to belief in miracles. 12 
Nineteenth-century liberalism and twentieth-century existen-
tialism and postexistential trends relied on Hume's critique as 
the reasoning behind the rejection of miracles. 
The nineteenth-century theological school of thought known 
as liberalism depended heavily on Hume's reasoning for the re-
jection of the miraculous. Perhaps the best example of this is 
found in the ideas of the German theologian David Strauss 
6 
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(1808-1874). In his hotly debated work A New Life of Jesus, 
Strauss claimed that because Hume's essay had completely dis-
proven the possibility of miracles, there was no longer any ques-
tion in his mind that events that contradict nature's laws do not 
occur. 13 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), often referred to as the 
father of liberalism, followed Hume's assertion that miracles are 
reported most often in areas where there is little knowledge of 
nature's laws. Supernatural occurrences must be rejected be-
cause they destroy the concept of nature and because there are 
no known examples of them. 14 
Heinrich Paulus (1761-1851), a German rationalist who de-
sired to judge theology by the criteria of reason, also denied that 
miracles were actual supernatural events. He held that the 
eyewitnesses of such events in Scripture were not aware of the 
laws of nature. For those who know these laws, the actual event 
remains, but not the miraculous element in it. Scholars must 
therefore discover the natural causes of so-called miracles.1s 
German theologian Bruno Bauer (1809-1882) agreed with 
Strauss that nature would be mocked if miracles occurred, since 
its laws would be violated. Therefore, such events must be re-
jected, for nature's laws cannot be denied. 16 
French scholar Ernst Renan (1823-1892) stated that Jesus 
accepted miracles as common occurrences, believing that they 
were not at all out of the ordinary. Jesus' belief was conditioned 
by the thought of His day and He was simply not aware that 
nature followed certain laws. In this sense, Jesus fell prey to 
ancient assumptions.17 
For German theologian Otto Pfleiderer (1839-1908), science 
had made great strides in its pursuit of knowledge over the past 
centuries. One of its achievements was recognizing that nature's 
laws have such regularity they cannot be changed or violated.1s 
Adolf Harnack (1851-1930), one of the last major scholars of 
nineteenth-century liberalism, held a view similar to that of his 
contemporaries. For ancient peoples miracles appeared to be 
common occurrences, because these people did not know about 
the existence of the laws of nature. But modern people cannot 
accept any events that interrupt these laws. Such events simply 
do not occur, and we cannot believe accounts of them. 19 
In documenting this influence ofHume's essay, it is not being 
asserted that no other Enlightenment thinkers before him ever 
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used similar arguments. Rather, as asserted by Randall, Strauss, 
and others, liberals followed Hume's thought as the definitive 
statement on this subject. 
In rejecting miracles, nineteenth-century liberal theologians 
not only followed Hume's insistence that the laws of nature can-
not be violated, but they also accepted Hume's suggestion that 
naturalistic alternatives to miraculous events are more probable 
than the actual miracles. 20 These theologians explained accounts 
of supernatural intervention in one of two ways. 
Some scholars, following views such as those of Paulus, offered 
rationalistic alternatives to "supposed" miracles. The most 
common technique was to accept the general framework of the 
circumstances and surroundings of a miracle as being historical, 
but then to provide a naturalistic explanation for the actual 
miraculous element. Others, following Strauss, treated the entire 
account, including the non miraculous circumstances, as having 
little or no basis at all in history. Almost the entire account was 
believed to be an expression of mythology meant to convey a 
message. 
Although Paulus's views gained acceptance by nineteenth-
century liberals, Strauss's mythological explanation was deemed 
to be more sophisticated by later critical scholars. In the twen-
tieth century the mythological approach found a strong propo-
nent in Rudolf Bultmann. 
This dismissal of miracles, revealing a definite reliance on 
Hume's essay, is not only a characteristic of nineteenth-century 
theological thought. As already mentioned, twentieth-century 
existentialism and contemporary postexistential trends reveal a 
similar dependence. 
For German New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann 
(1884-1976), modern man is too advanced to accept any literal 
concept of miracles. In this day of increased knowledge, the 
ancient world view cannot be comprehended literally. Because of 
the contemporary understanding of the laws of nature, what 
used to be considered miraculous is so no longer. Miracles 
should therefore be demythologized, or reinterpreted existen-
tially, in order for modern man to grasp the truth being ex-
pressed by the myth.21 
According to Paul Tillich (1886-1965), events that are super-
natural interferences with nature's laws cannot be accepted. 
Such a view, he claimed, distorts the workings of God. A miracle 
6 
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may be interpreted as an unusual or astonishing event as long as 
it is not believed to contradict naturallaws.22 
English theologian John A. T. Robinson (1919-) concurred 
with the idea that the modern world view has no place for 
mythological concepts. Accordingly, miracles and other myths 
must be rejected as being contrary to nature's laws. Super-
natural intervention is just not comprehensible in literal terms to 
modern man. The truth embedded in such concepts is what 
should be grasped.23 
American theologians Harvey Cox and Lawrence Burkholder 
directly cite Hume's essay as the major reason for the twentieth-
century rejection of miracles. Burkholder expresses some reser-
vations about a total acceptance ofHume's thesis but admits its 
strong influence on his own views. Cox notes that he and other 
scholars have been so profoundly affected by Hume's essay that 
they are unable to accept the literal reality of miracles. 24 
This brief survey has shown that both nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century critical scholars as a whole utilized Hume's 
essay to reject and reinterpret miracles. Several explicitly men-
tioned Hume's work as the key reason for this rejection. Without 
doubt, Hume's essay rejecting miracles on epistemological bases 
has exerted more influence on the scholarly world than has any 
other writing on this subject. 
The Empirical Testing of Scripture 
Hume's application of his epistemology to Scripture as a 
whole also exerted much influence on nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century philosophy. To Hume, a statement must con-
tain abstract reasoning or empirical data in order to be known to 
be true. Theology is subject to this empirical testing. The devel-
opment of this empirical test became a chief inspiration for 
twentieth-century logical positivism and linguistic analysis. 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) further clarified Hume's 
twofold distinction between abstract reasoning and experimental 
reasoning. Statements that are true by definition he termed 
analytical. Assertions that are true by empirical observation he 
termed synthetical. 25 Like Hume, Kant also concluded that 
metaphysical issues cannot be known, since they cannot be 
tested by empirical methods. Religious beliefs can be estab-
lished, to be sure, but by the exercise of practical reason and not 
by sense data. 
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French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-:-1857) agreed.~ith 
Kant that religious beliefs cannot be estabhshed by empmcal 
verification. But Comte went further in insisting that traditional 
metaphysics be eliminated. For Comte,. history is ~~aracterized 
by three major periods of thought. AnCIent man utilized theolog-
ical reasoning, endeavoring to lean on God and supernatural 
interferences for an understanding of the world. Then man 
passed through the metaphysical period, when abstract reasoning 
was believed to be the chief means of acquiring knowledge. 
Modern man, however, has reached the positive period, when 
scientific methodology is the key to knowledge. Humanity thus 
has reached the point where reliance on metaphysical specula-
tion is no longer needed. Rather than waste time on theological 
issues, concerning which we cannot really gain knowledge, we 
should concentrate on what is scientifically verifiable. In this 
way, then, Comte said, religious issues are outdated and illegiti-
mate avenues of inquiry.26 
In the early twentieth century empirical verification became 
an even more crucial issue. Austrian philosopher (and later 
Cambridge University professor) Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889:-
1951) stressed the importance of the study of language. In hIS 
famous Tractatus he argued that a careful analysis of language 
and thought is the chief occupation of philosophy. Many phi-
losophers dealt with meaning~ess issue~ that are n?t open. to 
verification such as metaphYSIcal questIons. For WIttgenstem, 
we can oniy speak of what we know and otherwise we must 
remain silent,21 
Another Austrian philosopher, Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), 
shared similar vIews. Schlick was the founder of the Vienna 
Circle a group of philosophers who were convinced of the need 
to an~lyze language. According to Schlick, the major goal for 
philosophy is to clarify the meanin.gs of assertions, thereby 
providing an empirical reference pomt for knowledge. Many 
meaningless debates in philosophy could thus be solved because 
of their lack of an empirical criterion of meaning.28 
The teachings ofWittgenstein, Schlick, and the Vienna Circle 
influenced the development of the school of thought known as 
logical positivism. Logical positivism was po~ularized by t~e 
English philosopher A. J. Ayer (1910- ), espeCIally through hIS 
work Language, Truth and Logic (1936). Ayer held that.a .sentence 
can be said to be significant in any factual way only If It can be 
i 
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either verified or falsified according to empirical criteria. If such 
a conclusion is not possible and if the sentence is not tautologi-
cal, then it is meaningless. 29 
Emerging from this discussion was the concept known as the 
verification principle. Factually meaningful statements are either 
analytical, and thereby true by definition, or they are synthetic, 
that is, capable of empirical validation. Analytic statements in-
clude assertions of pure logic, mathematics, and other tautologi-
cal statements. They provide no new knowledge concerning the 
factual world. Synthetic statements are capable of experiential 
verification (or falsification). If statements fall into neither of 
these two categories, then they are pronounced factually mean-
ingless.3o Ayer states that his verification principle is an out-
growth of Hume's thoughts on this subject.31 
The verification principle was not designed to be a test of 
truth, as such, b.ut rather an indicator of the meaningfulness of 
statements. By applying such criteria to philosophy and clarify-
ing both the purpose and methodology of the philosopher, Ayer 
concluded, many of the traditional debates could be by-passed as 
meaningless. Theological and ethical assertions, according to 
this standard, are literally meaningless because they cannot be 
verified or falsified. However, such statements were sometimes 
granted an emotive (but not factual) value. 
Interestingly enough, Ayer used his standard also against the 
statements of atheists and agnostics. Since any proposition about 
God is said to be nonsensical, no meaningful statement can be 
made to affirm God's nonexistence or even to assert that knowl-
edge about God is impossible. In short, all statements of any sort 
concerning God are nonsense, since they cannot be true by 
definition or by empirical verification.32 
Moral assertions are likewise said to lack any means by which 
they may be experientially tested, since they are not factual 
propositions. Rather, they express the speaker's personal 
sentiments. For instance, the statement "murder is wrong" is not 
factually testable and therefore cannot be proven to be either 
right or wrong. It only relates that the one making the statement 
believes that murder is wrong.33 
Ayer's verification principle is rejected by philosophers today, 
but many scholars still believe that the concept of verifiability or 
falsifiability is quite crucial. From such a concern developed the 
principle offalsification. Popularized by Antony Flew, this prin-
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ciple has the advantage of being flexible while still providing a 
means of testing assertions. 
According to Flew, whenever a statement is made, the condi-
tions under which it would be false should be ascertained. In 
other words, before we can really know if a statement is valid, we 
must also know what facts would make it invalid.34 Only after 
we know that no such probable negation exists can we contend 
that the original assertion is valid, providing there are also rea-
sons to accept it as being true. 
In spite of the popularity of logical positivism in the early 
twentieth century, it was plagued by several inherent weaknesses 
discussed in the Evaluation and Critique section below. Indeed, 
strictly speaking this school of thought no longer exists.35 Phi-
losophers of the last few decades have turned from logical 
positivism to a less rigid usage of related principles-linguistic 
~nalysis .. It has modified the stricter and more dogmatic assump-
tions of Its predecessor and has turned more attention to the 
subject of language analysis. 36 
Along with the development ofless rigid standards of veri fica-
tion, many linguistic analysts also became convinced that God-
talk was not so meaningless after all. For instance, today many 
linguistic analysts are convinced that certain areas of theology 
are open to verification. Topics such as God's existence, immor-
tality, and even miracles are discussed in a congenial light and 
are defended by some of these scholars.37 This school of thought 
no longer presents a unified front against metaphysics. Analytic 
philosophers are divided over the question of whether such pur-
suits are verifiable. 
To summarize: The ideas of David Hume have had a tremen-
dous influence on the denial of biblical authority. His rejection of 
particular evidences for the inspiration of Scripture-miracles 
and prophecy-was accepted by the religious liberals of the 
nineteenth century and by the existential and postexistential 
scholars of the twentieth century. Hume's assertion that theo-
logical works must be judged according to whether their state-
~ents are true either by definition or by empirical investigation 
mfluenced a number of philosophers, especially the Vienna Cir-
cle and logical positivists of the first half of the twentieth century. 
Following logical positivism, linguistic analysis has developed 
and, although less rigid in its evaluation of metaphysics, it still 
bears the stamp of David Hume's ideas. 
L 
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EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE 
The Rejection of Miracles 
39 
In spite of the continuing influence of Hume's essay "On 
Miracles," I am convinced that there are at least five valid criti-
cisms that invalidate Hume's entire argument. 
The first criticism is that in his definitive statements concern-
ing miracles and in his subsequent comparison of these events to 
humankind's experience of the laws of nature, Hume commits a 
number of errors in logic. For instance, he states: 
There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every mi-
raculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appella-
tion. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is 
here a direct and full protif, from the nature of the fact, against the 
existence of any miracle (Hume's italics) .38 
It is evident that Hume does not begin his study with an impar-
tiallook at the facts. Earlier we saw that he defines miracles so 
that they are totally opposed from the outset by what he terms 
"firm and unalterable experience" and "uniform experience." In 
this quotation he continues to postulate that all experience 
favors the absence of miracles. In addition, he specifically states 
that if all experience does not oppose such events, then they 
cannot even be called miracles. He concludes by stating that this 
is a proof against the miraculous. 
In his book Miracles C. S. Lewis notes that Hume can know 
that all experience favors his argument only by knowing in ad-
vance that all evidence in favor of miracle claims is false. But 
since he refuses to investigate miracles, he can know that these 
claims are false only by assuming that they do not happen. This 
is clearly circular reasoning, for Hume's position is certainly not 
evident a priori.39 
The alternative to the approach taken by Hume is to examine 
miracles that claim strong experiential support. While speaking 
of Christ's miracles, Hume fails to investigate the exceptionally 
good evidence for the chief miracle claim of Christianity-the 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. It is not valid to rule out an oppo-
nent's view by defining one's own position to be true while ig-
noring evidence to the contrary. 
Strangely enough, he even refers to his argument as a proof 
against the miraculous when, once again, he assumes that which 
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he neglects to prove, namely, that uniform experience and all 
other data rest against all miracles. He cannot annul experiential 
claims for such events by utilizing faulty definitions, by assuming 
the evidence needed to prove one's view (and by doing so circu-
larly), and by not examining the empirical, evidential claims in 
favor of the miraculous. 
Hume's position is an unproven assumption and cannot dis-
prove miracles. It is most noteworthy that even critical theolo-
gians admit that Hume argues circularly in this essay.40 
The second criticism is that Hume's conclusion that human-
kind's experience of the laws of nature provides superior evi-
dence against miracles in no way eliminates the possibility of the 
occasional intervention of a power still superior to these laws. 
At the outset it must be agreed that there are natural laws. But 
although these are known by scientific inquiry to exist, such laws 
do not dictate whether occasional abnormalities can occur. In 
other words, the mere existence of such laws proves nothing 
concerning whether there is a God who is capable of temporarily 
suspending them. Thus, Hume should be less concerned with 
nature itself and more concerned with whether such a Being has 
indeed broken into nature from the outside. 
Hume's concept describes what would happen if there is no 
intervention into nature by God. However, since it is possible that 
God exists and that He has sufficient power to temporarily sus-
pend the laws of nature, no amount of arguing from naturalistic 
premises inside a system can ever disprove the possibility that 
God has performed a recognizable event in nature from outside 
of it. Therefore, the proper question here is not the internal 
query of the strength of the laws of nature. Rather, the proper 
question concerns the possibility that God, by utilizing superior 
strength, temporarily suspended nature's laws in order to cause 
such events to occur. It is readily evident that no matter how 
strong this natural system is, it is useless to rest one's case on it if 
there is a stronger Force. 
A valid means of arriving at an answer to this issue of whether 
miracles have occurred would be to establish the validity of a 
theistic universe. By whatever means this is established, the en-
deavor would assign much importance to an investigation of the 
historical facts surrounding a claimed miracle-such as Jesus' 
resurrection-in order to ascertain the probability of that event 
occurring in history and being performed by God. It follows that 
tr 
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if the evidence points to a probable miracle, recognized as being 
performed by God, then such evidence is actually superior to the 
laws of nature at that moment, for it would reveal that natural law 
can be temporarily set aside by a superior Force. This is simply 
because, in order to occur, a miracle would involve God's tempo-
rary suspension of those laws.41 
It should be noted here that it has not been concluded that 
miracles have occurred. It is not the purpose of this essay to 
provide such an apologetic. It has only been pointed out that 
historical investigation of a miracle claim in a theistic universe 
might provide evidence that such an event may have happened. 
As such, an interference with the laws of nature might be the 
most probable solution. 
The third criticism ofHume's thesis is that he ignores a group 
of pUIf~orted .miracles that even he admits have outstanding evi-
den.ce III t~elr favor, namely, the alleged miracles of the Jan-
semsts of eighteenth-century France. After introducing the case 
for the Jansenist miracles, Hume evaluates the type of evidence 
they offer, seemingly according to his four supportive criteria.42 
In answer to the first criterion-that miracles must be attested 
by an adequate amount of witnesses in order to insure their 
validity-Hume admits that many of these Jansenist miracles 
"were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of un-
questioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinc-
tion." 
Concer~ing the second criterion-that people like to gossip 
and even he about wonderful events-Hume admits that among 
these witnesses were "determined enemies to those opinions" 
who were not able to disprove the Jansenist claims. 
. Although the third criteri~m states that miracles occur among 
Ignorant and barbarous nations, Hume explains that the Jan-
senist miracles occurred "in a learned age, and on the most 
eminent theatre that is now in the world."43 
Hume's fourth criterion states that the miracle claims of many 
different religions cancel out rival ideologies. But such a criterion 
would be valid only if all miracle claims were true. That one 
religion may back its revelation claims with invalid "miracles" is 
no reason to reject a religion possessing valid claims. Inept sys-
tems cannot cancel a religion that may be supported by evidence 
that is shown to be probable. Since obviously not all miracle 
claims are valid, historical investigation into evidential claims in 
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a theistic universe is needed to ascertain if any religion has a 
probable basis. 
Hume himself felt that the Jansenist claims had very strong 
positive evidence in their favor. How, then, does Hume respond 
to the concluding evaluation of the Jansenist miracles? He states: 
Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to 
the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose to such 
a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous 
nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes 
of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as sufficient refuta-
tion.44 
It is evident that Hume dismisses these claims not because of an 
insufficient basis of testimony, but because of the assumed im-
possibility of all miracles. Therefore, even such claims that are 
judged to have strong evidence are simply ignored. Again, in a 
clear example of circular reasoning, Hume assumes a conclusion 
because he has already decided in advance that "no testimony is 
sufficient to establish a miracle .... " 
The fourth criticism ofHume's argument is that his four sup-
portive criteria are invalid on historical grounds and cannot be 
applied to historical investigation. 
How many accepted historical events were established by such 
unquestionably good witnesses as to guard against all error and 
suspicion? How much history is prejudiced by the fact that the 
one reporting had much to gain, such as Julius Caesar's accounts 
of his military victories? Are the Roman wars with the Gauls to 
be judged fictitious? How much history took place among igno-
rant and barbarous nations? Do we rule out all of ancient history 
on this account? 
Clearly, by the standards that Hume used to judge miracles, 
history itself would be in question. However, it is well recognized 
that historical events can be known to a good degree of probabil-
ity in spite of such questions. In fact, few scholars of the 
eig.hteenth century recognized this better than Hume, who is 
qUIte well known as a historian45 as well as a philosopher. Yet, 
Hume did not subject his historical endeavors to these 
philosophical criteria. The criteria he described as being appli-
cable to records of miracles he would not apply to history as a 
whole. The results would obviously be self-defeating for such a 
scholar who was also involved in the writing of history. But it is 
i 
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e<;lual~y reasonable to reject the application of these criteria to 
h1stoncal accounts of miracles as well. 
.The fif!h and last criticism ofHume's stance on the question of 
m1racles 1S t~at, although Hume rejected the knowledge of cause 
an? efre~t, h1S argument against miracles clearly depends on the 
umform1ty of the laws of nature. C. S. Lewis notes that such a 
concept of uniformity rests on some form of causal argument. 
Hume must assume that the small part of nature that man does 
know is the same as that part of nature that man does not know. 
He must also :",ssume that nature in the future will follow its past 
pattern and V1ce versa.46 But how can these principles be known 
to .be true? T~1Us, the fact that miracles may not be occurring at 
~h1S present t1me does not indicate that they have not happened 
m the past or that they will not happen tomorrow. 
It is interesting that Hume fully realized that this was the case 
since he taught in other works that the past can provide no basi~ 
(othe.r than custom) for statements concerning the future. 
No~hmg can be known to be true concerning the future on the 
bas1s ofp.ast conformity. Certainly no prooffrom past experience 
can prov1de a knowledge of such a transition to the present or 
future. 47 
However, Hume abandoned this belief when he asserted that 
th: uniformity of natu~e's laws could be used as a prod against 
m1racles. He thereby vlOlated both his own philosophical princi-
ple and the need to ascertain if this is a theistic universe in which 
miracles occur in history. Therefore, his argument can by no 
m~ans rule out present or future miracles, to say nothing of any 
eV1dence for past miraculous events. 
We thus conclude our overall critique by asserting that 
Hume's method of rejecting miracles must itself be rejected. 
As noted above.' H~me's es.say was also the chief inspiration 
~or the mode:n r:J~ctlOn of m1racles. Updating Hume's reason-
mg and pl~cmg 1t m contemporary garb, it became popular to 
argue, for mstance, that no evidence is sufficient to establish a 
miracle, since anything occurring in nature must be a natural 
event. Related approaches are taken by scholars such as Alastair 
McKinnon48 and Patrick Nowell-Smith.49 Another example is 
Flew's position that miracles are nonrepeatable events whereas 
the scientifically esta,hlished. laws of nature are repea;able and 
therefore more read1ly venfiable. Therefore, the scientific is 
given precedence over the historical, and whenever an event 
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suspends the laws of nature, the law is simply expanded to in-
clude such events, therefore leaving only nonmiraculous, natural 
occurrences.50 Such scholars additionally argue that a miracle 
could not be recognized as such even if one did occur. But it must 
likewise be concluded that those who reject miracles based on 
Hume's reasoning (including such modern renditions) must also 
be said to have done so invalidly. Although not following 
Hume's exact arguments, there are at least three points at which 
the critique given above also applies generally to these ap-
proaches today. 
First, it is an improper procedure to define miracles incor-
rectly or to arbitrarily attempt to mount up the facts against 
them so that no evidence could establish their occurrence. It is 
thus clearly invalid to automatically state that any event in na-
ture must be a natural event. That conclusion can be reached 
only ifthe possibility that God caused the event has already been 
ruled out. And that can only be established by an investigation of 
the facts. As remarked by C. S. Lewis, when such has not been 
done, the naturalist can only assume his position by arguing cir-
cularly, for such a position is certainly not evident a priori.51 
Thus, one cannot assume that naturalism is the correct position 
by such circular reasoning any more than theists can state the 
case so that all such occurrences in question could be called 
miracles. Such approaches cannot properly solve this issue. 
Such naturalistic theses also fall prey to the second critique of 
Hume. It was pointed out that one cannot determine, even by 
viewing the scientific evidence for the laws of nature, whether 
God intervened by a superior power to perform miracles. It 
should be obvious here that if a miracle has occurred, it cannot 
be called a natural event just becaus~ it happened in nature or 
because science has established these laws. Indeed, miracles must 
normally happen in nature if men are going to know of them at 
all. But the crucial question of the cause of the event, which .is the 
most important factor, is not determined by such naturalistic 
approaches. God could still have caused such an event to occur in 
nature by exerting power superior to that of the natural laws. 
Therefore, our earlier point should be remembered-if probable 
evidence does indicate that a recognizable miracle has occurred 
in a theistic universe, then it provides superior evidence because it 
indicates that the laws of nature, however strong or scientifically 
verified, were temporarily suspended. 
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We noted above that Hume neglected to examine the possibil-
ity that God exists and that He acted in history to perform a 
miracle. This criticism also applies to the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century reworkings of Hume's thesis, because if there 
is probable evidence for a recognizable miracle having occurred 
in a theistic universe, it cannot be dismissed simply by calling it 
a natural event. Neither can these events be dismissed by refer-
ring to the scientific verification of the laws of nature and then by 
expanding or adjusting these laws accordingly. This has already 
been shown in our previous two points and we will now present a 
third point against these naturalistic approaches. 
It is true that if a miracle repeatedly occurs in a predictable 
manner under certain conditions, then it is probably more ap-
propriate to attempt to adjust the law than to continue to call it a 
supernatural event. There are, however, several indications that 
an original law is correct and that a real miracle may have 
occurred and that it is recognizable as such. For instance, if a 
given law applies in all instances except the one in question, we 
have a good indication that the law is valid, especially since 
science relies so much on repeatability. Additionally, it may be 
virtually impossible to arrive at a new law that allows for the 
event, since it is so contrary to known reality. Also, a new law 
may endeavor to account for an event at the expense of allowing 
so many abIlormalities that the original purpose behind the law 
is lost-in other words, it is no longer workable, due to its being 
qualified to such a large extent.52 
Therefore, if a probable event had certain characteristics, a 
good case could be made for it being a miracle. The strongest 
example would be an event that had at least four features. First, 
this occurrence would be nonrepeatable; second, it would be 
contrary to at least one law of nature; third, this would be the 
only known exception to this law; fourth, there would be no 
viable means by which to change the law without losing the law's 
purpose or workability, especially when the event is so contrary 
to known reality. 
This is not to say that occurrences without such characteristics 
cannot be miraculous. Rather, it is being asserted that events 
that do have all four features present a much stronger case, as 
well as providing additional pointers as to its recognizability as a 
miracle. 
This brings us back to our major critique, which asserts that 
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the facts must be examined in order to determine if such events 
have actually happened. I suggest that a strong refutation of 
both Burne and those who generally accept his thesis is that the 
resurrection of Jesus can be said, according to probability, to be 
an actual historical event performed by God in a theistic uni-
verse. Jesus' resurrection fulfills the four criteria listed above. 
The raising of Jesus was a nonrepeatable event and was 
definitely contrary to the natural laws governing the process 
called death. This event is the only probable exception to these 
laws and there is no known means to modifY or change them. 
The universal law of death is that a dead person does not rise 
by any known natural means, especially in a glorified body, as 
reported by the eyewitnesses. Interestingly enough, Burne 
explicitly stated that the resurrection of a dead man would be 
a true miracle, necessitating the involvement of supernatural 
powers.53 
The purpose here is not to present an apologetic for Jesus' 
resurrection and for a Christian theistic world view, but to show 
that, as a probable historical event, this thesis offers a final and 
substantial criticism of Burne's position and also disproves those 
who have followed Burne's thesis. It is obvious that if a miracle 
has occurred, then the laws of nature were temporarily sus-
pended, and positions to the contrary are incorrect. 
Bere we conclude our critique of Burne's essay against mira-
cles and the views of those who have followed along similar lines 
of thought. Five criticisms were leveled at Burne and three criti-
cisms were reapplied to contemporary approaches which follow 
Burne. In conclusion, it was found that miracles cannot be ruled 
out a priori. The possibility must be allowed that in a theistic 
universe God could have temporarily suspended the laws of na-
ture by a superior power in order to perform a miracle; therefore, 
we must investigate the evidence to ascertain ifsuch an event has 
occurred. 
The Use oj Empirical Criteria 
Burne not only greatly influenced the rejecting of particular 
miraculous evidences for the inspiration of Scripture; he also 
doubted inspiration as a whole by suggesting that any theolog~­
cal work, such as the Bible, should be tested to see whether It 
contains abstract reasoning (and is thereby true by definition) or 
experimental reasoning (and is true by empirical data). If 
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neither test applies, then the work is said to be factually mean-
ingless. This testing by means of empirical criteria also 
influenced philosophers, especially the logical positivists of the 
early twentieth century. In spite of the popularity of various 
types of empirical testing, we will note three criticisms that re-
veal that strict applications of this methodology are invalid. 
The major problem for logical positivism was that the verifica-
tion principle could not be verified. In other words, it failed its 
own test. This principle obviously cannot be true by abstract 
reasoning. First, such a position cannot be defined to be true. 
Second, tautological statements are said to reveal no real infor-
mation about the world, whereas the verification principle is 
plainly intended to communicate a standard of meaningfulness. 
Nor can this principle be true by empirical testing, because sense 
data cannot prove that the only valid way to gain knowledge is 
by empiricism. In short, there was no way to verifY the verifica-
tion principle itself. Thus, positivism failed by its own epis-
temological standard. By endeavoring to show that theology was 
factually invalid, positivism factually invalidated itself. 
It is interesting that Ayer agreed with this criticism and 
modified the verification principle in later years.54 This criticism 
is generally accepted today, so that, strictly speaking, logical 
positivism no longer exists as a philosophical school of thought. 55 
This criticism applies not only to Burne and to logical 
positivists but also to other philosophers who advocate that, 
except for statements that a[/~ true by definition, only empirically 
verifiable truths are meaningful. This includes the views of 
Comte, Schlick, and the Vienna Circle. In fact, this critique 
applies to any view that asserts that the only (or the chief) means 
of acquiring knowledge is by sense data. Briefly stated, there is 
no way to demonstrate that this is the only (or major) approach 
to epistemological issues. There is no way to prove that empirical 
investigation occupies such an exclusive (or semiexclusive) posi-
tion. 
Our second major criticism of these positions is that the possi-
bility of miracles is often still rejected through the influence of 
Burne's essay. In other words, these philosophers have followed 
Burne in dismissing miracles not only because of the empirical 
criteria just discussed (criticism number one) but also because of 
man's experience of the laws of nature as seen earlier in this 
chapter. An example has already been noted above in the ap-
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proach of Flew. However, it has been shown how Hume's rea-
soning against miracles (and those who follow him) is a second 
failure to explain away the miraculous. It should now be obvious 
that such attempts are still invalid for reasons such as those set 
forth earlier. 
The third major criticism of such naturalistic hypotheses is 
that, once the strict application of empirical criteria is found to 
be faulty, theological issues can no longer be judged to be 
meaningless. Even Ayer admits that statements that cannot be 
said to be true either by definition or by empirical data may still 
be meaningful. In fact, he explicitly asserts that metaphysical 
statements cannot be eliminated without in-depth analyses of 
particular supportive arguments.56 
Once again, establishing a theistic universe relegates much 
meaning to an investigation of history to ascertain if recognizable 
miracles have occurred. Such is a meaningful endeavor. In-
terestingly, if the resurrection of Jesus was shown to be histori-
cally valid, this would be a decision in favor of an empirical 
event, established by the sense experience of the earliest eyewit-
nesses. Thus, even by the standards of a strict empiricism, there 
would be a solid miraculous basis for Christianity. If this or 
other miracles were shown to be historically (and empirically) 
valid, they would also constitute a final refutation of such views, 
as noted earlier. 
Therefore, Hume's empirical criterion of testing is also not a 
valid procedure. Strict applications of such empirical standards 
of verification are clearly invalid. Indeed, some linguistic 
analysts do believe that metaphysical issues are not only mean-
ingful but verifiable, as mentioned above. 
To be sure, the philosophy of David Hume has been instru-
mental in causing many of the contemporary doubts concerning 
the inerrancy of the Scripture. His twofold support of errancy in 
the form of his essay against miracles and his proposal for em-
pirical testing especially influenced nineteenth- and twentieth-
century philosophical and theological schools of thought. It is 
possible that his influence in this area is unparalleled in the 
history of philosophy. Yet, it is plain that both of these lines of 
argument, having been themselves disproven, have failed to dis-
prove either the inspiration of the Scriptures or the miraculous 
element contained in it. 
Thus we conclude this essay by asserting that both Hume's 
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position against miracles and his strict use of empirical testing 
are in:ralid. Several criticisms have been applied to each concept, 
r:vealmg ~hat they are abortive attempts to dismiss the inspira-
tIOn ofScnpture, as are modern renditions of similar argumenta-
tion. It was not our purpose here to construct a positive apolo-
getic for inspiration or for God's existence, miracles, eternal life, 
or other aspects of theology that have been called into question 
by such methods. Yet such an apologetic is a distinct possibility, 
especially when such critical attempts fail. 57 
